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withdrawal of these large forces in case of necessity would involve loss of "face," and would increase the military difficulties of evacuation. We are strongly opposed to the dispersion of force involved, and to so large a military commitment.
(3.) We recommend that, if the reoccupation of the Concession is undertaken, there should be no preliminary warning other than that inevitably involved in the embarkation of the necessary forces at Shanghai and their transportation to Hankow.
(4.) We consider that until the end of November the line of communications
of the force at Hankow with the sea can be maintained. (5.) Judged by ordinary military standards the above operations would be hazardous, owing to the long and exposed line of communications and to the fact that the British Concession at Hankow can be dominated by artillery established in adjacent hills, but the Chinese Army falls below the normal standard, and we assume that the local Naval and Military authorities, who support this operation and who are in the best position to judge, are satisfied that the risks can be accepted.
(6.) The destruction, or partial destruction, of the Hanyang Arsenal is, in our opinion, a feasible military operation. It might, however, antagonise the various forces hostile to the extremist faction at Hankow and so increase our difficulties. In any event it would outrage local opinion at Hankow and might lead to reprisals against British property and the preparation of resistance to the re-occupation of the Concession. consider, therefore, that, unless it is required as a military measure in connection with the re-occupation or subsequent retention of the Conces- sion, the destruction of the Arsenal should be kept in reserve for the present.
We
(7.) In view of the great fall of the water-level at low water (the 30th November to the 26th March), which varies from 14 feet at Wuhu to 45 feet at Hankow, the small craft which alone can navigate the river above Wuhu during that period will encounter great difficulty in dealing with forts and guns on the other side of the steep banks. In these circumstances, apart from the risks referred to in conclusion (5), we cannot guarantee that communications with Hankow can be kept open during the months referred to.
(Signed)
BEATTY.
G. F. MILNE. H. TRENCHARD.
APPENDIX.
The Hanyang Arsenal.
The Hanyang Arsenal covers 10 acres of ground on the right bank of the Han River, by which it is separated from Hankow city itself. Adjoining the Arsenal are the Hanyang Iron and Steel Works, which are owned by the Hanyehping Company. There are considerable Japanese financial interests in the Hanyehping Company.
The Hanyang Arsenal has been occupied by the Cantonese since September 1926. Since that date no information has been received as to the condition and output of the Arsenal.
The older machinery of the Arsenal is Krupp, mostly supplemented in recent years from the Shanghai Arsenal, though some American machinery has also been purchased. About 5,000 men are normally employed in the Arsenal and in the adjacent Smokeless Powder Factory. The normal output, capable of great increase under pressure, is :
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200 Rifles (Mauser pattern) per day.
200 Bayonets per day.
20 Mauser pistols.
5 Machine Guns (Maxim pattern) per month.
Rifle ammunition about 3 million rounds per month.
1 Mountain Gun per month.
12 Small Guns per month.
The Hanyang Powder Factory is believed to be capable of producing 1,000 lbs. of Smokeless Powder per day.
2, Whitehall Gardens, S.W.1, April 29, 1927.
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